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Introduction
Recent evidence demonstrates strong
links between developing countries’ long-
term growth and financial reform. Deputy
Treasury Secretary Kenneth Dam has
suggested that developing countries can
transform their domestic financial sectors
into “engines of growth.”
In this context, the relevant question
for trade negotiators approaching the
Doha Round of negotiations is: “How can
the WTO negotiations strengthen this
linkage between financial reform and eco-
nomic growth and development?” Finan-
cial services liberalization has been in-
cluded in WTO negotiations twice before,
with mixed results. An interim agreement
was concluded in 1995 at the initiative of
the European Union. In that agreement
the United States withdrew most favored
nation treatment in financial services in
response to the reluctance of the govern-
ments of emerging-market economies to
provide reciprocal market access. It com-
mitted itself only to granting market ac-
cess and national treatment (i.e., the same
legal and regulatory treatment as that ac-
corded to domestic firms) to existing for-
eign service providers.
In the standalone Financial Services
Agreement (FSA), concluded on Decem-
ber 13, 1997, 104 WTO members made
commitments. When it took effect in
March 1999, the FSA marked a milestone
because a significant number of members
bound market access commitments for the
first time. They agreed to a legal frame-
work for cross-border trade and market
access and to a mechanism for settling
disputes. The FSA also extended the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services
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The significance of the 1997
Financial Services Agreement
should not be overstated.
Neither the OECD countries...
nor developing countries...
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(GATS) to financial services, adding to existing agree-
ments in the telecommunications and information
technology industries.
But the significance of the 1997 FSA should not
be overstated. Neither OECD countries, which are
already quite open, nor developing countries which
are not, made commitments amounting to much fur-
ther market opening beyond the status quo. The
United States provided reciprocal access to its mar-
ket, but most OECD countries already have such ac-
cess, and emerging-market economies found this
prospect of little interest.
Why the apparent paradox between the long-term
promise of financial-sector reform and the reluctance
of developing countries to open their financial
markets? What are the connections between
financial-sector reform and liberalization of markets
for financial services? Why is there such a widespread
impression that liberalization increases the chances
of financial crises in developing countries? What are
the benefits and costs of reform? Of opening? What
are the best approaches and highest priorities?
These were some of the questions that motivated
the Institute for International Economics to organize
a conference? at the request of the Treasury
Department? titled  “Further Liberalization of Global
Financial Services Markets?” on June 5, 2002.
Several factors influence the answers to the mo-
tivating questions. One is the relationship between
financial reform and various forms of liberalization.
Another is the differing interests of the respective
players. A third factor is certain weaknesses in the
structure of the GATS. This policy brief examines
these factors and then provides a number of recom-
mendations for where we might go from here.
Financial Reform and Liberalization—Some
Background
The term “liberalization” applied to financial ser-
vices in the WTO refers to market opening—that is,
the removal of restrictions on market entry for for-
eign service providers. WTO concerns with market
access should be distinguished from capital account
liberalization or convertibility, a term that refers to
the freedom with which capital inflows and outflows
of varying maturities are allowed to move across bor-
ders, and which is a responsibility of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF).
The two policies are not unrelated. De facto capi-
tal account liberalization has occurred in the past
few decades as many countries have legalized for-
eign currency instruments in the face of increased
trade flows, the internationalization of production,
and improved communications.
Central to the success of both market access and
capital account liberalization, however, is domestic
liberalization, or what is more commonly known as
financial reform. This term refers to the process of
deregulation. Deregulation has several dimensions.
One is the withdrawal of government intervention
through privatizing state-owned banks, for example,
thus freeing key prices like interest rates to be mar-
ket-determined. A second dimension is the freeing
of restrictions on intrasectoral activities so that
banks can offer insurance, for example. A third di-
mension is the strengthening of domestic financial
institutions and markets to increase the efficiency
with which finance is channeled from depositors and
investors to borrowers and issuers. Domestic resi-
dents benefit from more efficient financial institu-
tions in several ways: through cheaper financing, a
wider menu of options for diversifying risk and  at-
taining higher rates of return, and from a larger
pool of investable funds.
Domestic deregulation, market opening, and
capital account convertibility do not have to march
in lockstep. Taiwan, for example, has not fully de-
regulated its domestic financial markets and it still
imposes some restrictions on the capital account,
but it permits foreign entry. The ASEAN economies
of Southeast Asia have not been fully deregulated
and foreign entry is still restricted, but their capital
accounts have largely been opened. Until the Asian
financial crisis in late 1997, South Korea restricted
both foreign entry and capital flows and had many
domestic reforms to make as part of its accession
agreement to the OECD. Since then, it has removed
most of these restrictions. Chile reformed its do-
mestic financial market in the late 1970s, opened
its capital account in 1980, experienced a financial
crisis and reversed its capital account liberalization
but later resumed it.
China and India are among the main Asian coun-
tries that still have closed capital accounts (although
FDI flows are encouraged) and foreign participation
in the financial sector is restricted. As part of its
WTO accession agreement, China has made signifi-
cant undertakings to permit foreign entry over the
next five years. Thus, while there is  no cookie cut-
ter sequence, it should be recognized that as a coun-
try undertakes domestic financial reform and opens
Weaknesses in the GATS framework
and certain trends in financial
development cast doubt
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its market to foreign service providers, at some point
the provision of modern financial services will be
hampered by continued capital account restrictions,
thereby increasing pressures for capital account con-
vertibility. The key, as several participants empha-
sized, is to approach convertibility, especially at the
short end, with great care.
The Players
The main players in financial services negotia-
tions are emerging-market economies and the ma-
ture industrial economies in the OECD (South Ko-
rea and Mexico are represented in both groups, but
for the purposes of this analysis are included in the
former group). The widely differing objectives of these
two groups suggest good reasons why so little mar-
ket opening beyond the status quo was negotiated
in 1997.
OECD governments sought market access to
emerging markets through the FSA for their large
financial firms. These firms face maturing markets
at home. At the same time,  their  technologies  slash
transactions costs, enabling them to take advantage
of business opportunities and higher rates of return
in the dynamic offshore economies.
Goals of developing-country governments differ.
These governments must decide how quickly they
will integrate their economies with the rest of the
world and the role they wish foreign financial insti-
tutions to play.  They are interested in foreign capi-
tal inflows (and to a lesser extent entry by foreign
institutions) to accelerate growth over what it would
otherwise be, if they relied  exclusively on domestic
savings and domestic financial institutions. As the
Asian financial and economic crisis of 1997-98 (and
the experiences of the southern cone countries in
Latin America in the 1980s) demonstrated, however,
mobile capital by itself can be dangerous if such flows
are allowed without sufficient planning and man-
agement. But it is worth noting that an exclusive
focus on attracting foreign capital could mean that
a country overlooks a significant ingredient of finan-
cial system development, namely the role of foreign
financial firms in improving the efficiency of domes-
tic financial markets.
Capital inflows take several forms: short-term
debt and equity (portfolio) flows, commercial bank
lending, and bonds. These instruments can contrib-
ute to volatility if investors flee at signs of uncer-
tainty or trouble. Of more value, but not without
risk, is long-term FDI, which brings not only foreign
control but also the transfer of more sophisticated
technologies.
Thus, financial services liberalization in the WTO
will promote a country’s growth and welfare in two
main ways: first, by providing a legal framework that
reassures foreign institutions investing for the long
term and second, by providing a source of external
pressure for change and transparency. While many
emerging-market economies have begun to reform
their financial-services sectors, to open their mar-
kets, and to realize these benefits, some are reluc-
tant to deregulate fully, whereas others are reluc-
tant to open. They cite several significant reasons.
The first reason is the mixed experience of coun-
tries that have deregulated financial markets, opened
their markets, and liberalized their capital accounts.
Banking and financial crises are associated with
reform and internationalization, or the wrong se-
quence of such changes. One analysis of banking
crises worldwide found that, in 18 of 25 cases stud-
ied, financial liberalization had occurred some time
in the previous five years (Kaminsky and Reinhart
1999). Reforming and internationalizing the domestic
financial system entails risks, especially if govern-
ments continue to regulate and supervise financial
systems in the same way. To minimize these risks,
regulatory institutions and supervisory systems
must be modernized and strengthened to enable
those charged with oversight to evaluate the risks
inherent in a more complex, market-oriented sys-
tem. Striking a balance between financial-market
efficiency and economic stability is difficult, as dem-
onstrated by the US savings and loan crisis of the
1980s and its aftermath, the Scandinavian crises of
the early 1990s, and by Japan’s ongoing struggle to
work out the banking crisis that began in the early
1990s.
Kaminsky and Reinhart presented their latest
findings at the Institute conference. They have found
that hasty liberalization (i.e., domestic reform) with
little thought to the consequences or to the rela-
tionship with the capital account tends to be asso-
ciated with crises. They also observed that while fi-
nancial reform and capital account convertibility sta-
bilize financial markets in the long run, in the short
Future advances in market access in
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negotiations…there is a discernible
trend toward gradual unilateral opening
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run the relationship is not so easy to establish, partly
because reform and market opening may trigger fi-
nancial excesses initially as well as changes in insti-
tutional arrangements in the longer term.
These findings emphasize the importance of
multiple factors in the trade-off. The general conclu-
sion is that there is neither a universal recipe nor a
standard sequence for domestic reform and interna-
tionalization. The case studies agree, however, that
macroeconomic preconditions and the strength of the
financial sector influence the chances of successful
adjustment. Economies with stable and realistic
prices (including exchange rates) and prudent fiscal
policies do better because the creditworthiness of
potential domestic borrowers is superior. Those that
have reformed and strengthened the domestic finan-
cial sector—by freeing up interest rates, reducing
credit subsidization, strengthening financial insti-
tutions and their supervision—have met necessary
preconditions to easing restrictions on the capital
account and to full-scale internationalization.
Second, it is frequently argued that finance is
special because of the important services the finan-
cial sector provides to a growing and developing
economy. Financial services, in this view, are there-
fore best owned and controlled by domestic inter-
ests. More sophisticated foreign entrants, pursuing
different objectives, could come to dominate the in-
dustry to the detriment of national objectives. In the
extreme, this argument has merit—few governments
would tolerate 100 percent foreign ownership of major
domestic financial institutions. But foreign partici-
pation brings substantial benefits and can be man-
aged—indeed the 1997 FSA explicitly allows for such
management. Foreign participation, judiciously su-
pervised, provides access to foreign savings, techni-
cal transfer, and is a force for modernization. The
presence of foreign firms increases the competitive-
ness, efficiency, and diversity of the financial sector.
The speed of innovation and the interconnectedness
of markets imply that continuing with the status
quo—that is, heavily restricting foreign entry—will
be costly because households are denied better re-
turns and businesses are denied lower financing
costs. In the long term, the impact will be to reduce
growth and competitiveness. This link between real-
sector activity and finance is perhaps the central is-
sue.
Third, domestic financial reform and internation-
alization are often politically difficult because, while
users of financial services (including businesses,
households, and governments) stand to benefit, other
powerful interests stand to lose. Introducing compe-
tition threatens significant interests within the local
financial industry, just as reduction of the role of
government threatens the position of certain bureau-
cratic interests. Reluctant governments who must
manage the difficult political economy of financial
reform and internationalization do have a point, one
which trade negotiators should take into account.
Market opening and capital account liberalization
present real risks as well as political risks.
The answer, however, is not to halt the process
of reform and liberalization. Rather it is to proceed,
while putting primary emphasis on strengthening the
system’s ability to evaluate and manage risk. The
implication for negotiating strategies is that diplo-
matic pressure should be applied in a way that
strengthens the process. This requires a delicate mix
of determined pressure for further opening with
enough flexibility to make sure that the domestic
political debate responds to rather than rejects that
pressure, thus strengthening the hands of those who
push for opening the financial markets. The down-
side risk of complacency—of failing to insist on re-
form—is that nothing worthwhile gets done, but the
downside risk of requirements that are too demand-
ing is that antiforeign sentiment builds, eventually
upsetting the domestic coalitions required to sup-
port reform. Such reasoning seems to have influ-
enced only a few governments.  In the 1997 FSA ne-
gotiations only limited progress on market access to
developing economies was achieved, and mostly in
the insurance and securities industries (see table
1).
Going forward, the focus of the WTO negotiations
on freer cross-border trade and foreign entry in fi-
nancial services will reflect the fact that many stan-
dard policy interventions in the financial sector are
untouched by commitments within the GATS. In
particular,  countries retain the scope for macroeco-
nomic policy; meanwhile the so-called “carve-out pro-
vision” in the GATS protects prudential regulation.
To the extent that they are compatible with broad
market access, national treatment, and scheduled
commitments to liberalize, other government finan-
cial policies can still be maintained, but in a more
open context, under a multilateral agreement.
The fundamental issue remains
 how to persuade reluctant
developing countries that
opening their financial markets
to foreign service providers is
in their long-term interest.      August 2002 PB02-8 5
Table 1  World Trade Organization financial services agreement:
             Market access in selected emerging markets, 1997
Banking Insurance Securities




The Philippines The Philippines
Mexico
Status quo    Argentina       Chile          Argentina
   Brazil                               India          Thailand
   Chile       Thailand
   India
   Indonesia
   Japan
   South Korea
   Thailand
Less than status quo    The Philippines                Malaysia*         Chile
        India
* This entry compares existing practice in 1998 with Malaysia’s commitment in December 1997.
Source: Dobson and Jacquet (1998, 93).
The GATS Framework and the Doha Round
The GATS framework as it affects market access
issues will influence future prospects for multilat-
eral financial-services sector negotiations. The GATS
has some significant design challenges that apply to
financial services. Services are a heterogeneous group
of products, with the common thread that most of
them are subject to government intervention. Weak-
nesses in the GATS framework and certain trends in
financial development cast doubt on its ability to sus-
tain further market opening.
The positive list approach: One weakness is the
positive list approach to commitments. Positive lists
identify sectors where commitments are made, rather
than those where they are not. This approach was
all that could be agreed to at the time the GATS was
negotiated. It contrasts with the negative list ap-
proach, employed in the negotiations of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, where countries
commit to full liberalization unless specific exclu-
sions are negotiated. With the negative list approach,
market opening and market access are the central
objective; in contrast, the positive list approach tends
to reinforce the status quo and makes it difficult to
liberalize potentially significant sectors.
Further, it implies that as new sectors emerge,
they stand outside the market-opening framework
until explicitly brought into it.
Reciprocity is another weakness of the GATS
framework. The division of the WTO negotiations along
sectoral lines—that is, separating services from goods
and individual services from each other—makes reci-
procity less credible and less effective. Reserving fi-
nancial services negotiations for finance ministers
makes such linkages even more difficult. Asymmetry
in the interests of OECD and developing countries in
services negotiations adds to the difficulties. This
asymmetry of interests was evident in the 1997 FSA
where developing countries complained that they had
made most of the market-opening and other conces-
sions—because the OECD producers sought access
to their markets, not the converse. Nevertheless, the
fact that the FSA—and the Information Technology
Agreement (ITA) before it—were completed shows that
the approach can deliver something.
Financial-sector opening and domestic financial re-
form have lives of their own. Multilateral negotiations
take place in the context of the market-led trend to-
ward globalization of the sector. While the 1997 ne-
gotiations reflected GATS principles to the extent pos-
sible, the outcome was largely to bind the status quo
on market access and to create agreed procedures
for settling disputes. Telecommunications and finan-
cial services are among the fastest-growing and fast-
est-evolving industrial sectors in the world economy.
Their growth and evolution are being driven by theAugust 2002 PB02-8 6
information and communications technology (ICT)
revolution and by domestic deregulation as govern-
ments scramble to catch up with market forces that
drive the rapidly changing transactions, business ar-
rangements, and cross-border flows in these services.
Evolution in the financial-services sector is also be-
ing driven by the emergence of new services such as
asset and wealth management that take it beyond
the traditional banking, securities, and insurance
players.
Evidence for the link between financial-market de-
velopment and an economy’s long-term growth and de-
velopment. The severity and extensiveness of the East
Asian crisis by late 1997 made it clear that weak fi-
nancial systems were one of a combination of signifi-
cant causal factors. Thus, although East Asian gov-
ernments saw little to gain from reciprocal access to
the OECD economies, they were anxious to signal
their commitment to reform as a way to restore tat-
tered credibility. Perhaps one of the most significant
changes in the sector since 1997 is the solid evidence
that confirms the link between growth and financial-
market development. Gerard Caprio’s (Caprio 2002)
presentation to the Institute conference stressed the
importance for governments to reduce state owner-
ship, build solid infrastructure, improve the infor-
mation infrastructure and technology to reduce in-
termediation costs, provide limited safety nets and
use incentives to induce better market monitoring,
and increase the clout of supervisors. His “naïve”
and modeled relationship between financial devel-
opment and growth (see figure 1) shows a markedly
positive relationship across countries between av-
erage GDP growth and financial development, mea-
sured by private credit growth as percent of GDP,
over the 1960-95 period.
Recommendations: Where To From Here?
What might be possible at Doha? The outcome
will be influenced by the goals of the players and by
factors outlined above. Box 1 illustrates in very con-
crete language the objectives of the US insurance
industry, endorsed by Maurice Greenberg of the
American International Group and Brant Free of
Chubb Corporation. In fuller terms, there follow
several recommendations applicable not only to the
insurance industry but also to a wide range of fi-
nancial services in developed and developing coun-
tries alike.
Liberalize whenever and wherever possible
 Future advances in market access in financial
services will not come solely from multilateral nego-
tiations. Instead, there is a discernible trend toward
Figure 1  Naïve and modeled impact of financial development on growth
Private credit as percentage of GDP (log) 
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other routes to market access: gradual unilateral
opening has occurred in a number of countries as
part of overall structural reforms; in others it has
been part of regional or bilateral liberalization ar-
rangements; IMF programs have also provided an im-
portant source of reforms. Hence, while it is worth-
while to ask how the current WTO process can be
improved, experience with the FSA suggests that fu-
ture progress may be expected from a combination
of sources. Countries on IMF programs after the Asian
crisis agreed to faster and more extensive domestic
reform and foreign entry than was negotiated in the
FSA. More recently, the inclusion of the financial
sector in IMF surveillance gives another push. Other
forums such as APEC have also helped. Japan and
Singapore unilaterally accelerated the modernization
of their financial sectors by allowing further foreign
entry because they feared being bypassed for other
international financial centers.
Priority areas for liberalization should reflect
best practice
 The foregoing might suggest a WTO role that
merely codifies reforms, many of which were negoti-
ated elsewhere. Conference participants, however,
stressed that WTO negotiations should have a more
significant role. They should facilitate the right of
companies to establish and operate freely; market
conditions, not ownership limits, should determine
foreign entry. Conference participants from the fi-
nancial-services industries emphasized the impor-
tance of best practices. Representatives of insurance
industry associations throughout the OECD coun-
tries presented a Model Schedule for use by WTO
members in making commitments in the forthcom-
ing Round (Financial Leaders Working Group 2002).
The Model Insurance Schedule has two basic ele-
ments. First is traditional market access. This in-
cludes the right to establish an insurance operation
as a branch, joint venture, or wholly-owned subsid-
iary—whatever makes the most business sense. It
also includes national treatment and MFN commit-
ments, and key operating rights. The second element
covers a recommended framework of procompetitive
regulatory practices designed to promote an optimal
insurance environment. The Model Schedule includes
proposed text for use  within the existing GATS frame-
work on market access, national treatment, and do-
mestic regulation.
Other industry participants observed that repu-
tation rather than market share drives their consid-
eration of whether or not to enter a foreign market.
Since local glitches can undermine their global brand,
control of local operations is essential to ensure that
rigorous operational standards are met. Foreign ser-
vice providers should also be subject to regulatory
treatment that is identical to that for domestic com-
panies. Current practices of limiting foreign bank ATM
offerings, for example, deny them network externali-
ties that are increasingly vital to the provision of
modern financial services. Participants also empha-
sized the importance of free cross-border trade in
services and free movement of personnel; limited and
transparent exemptions; and grandfathering to pro-
tect existing investments from new deviations from
established principles.
Improve the WTO role in binding reforms
agreed outside of a round
The combination of non-WTO processes and mar-
ket forces, plus the WTO binding mechanism and
dispute settlement, can jointly contribute to an ef-
fective international trade regime. Financial-services
reforms that open markets are often agreed as part
of IMF programs, to strengthen national financial sys-
tems and increase resilience to future crises. These
reforms should be bound in the WTO. This does not
mean the IMF and WTO should gang up on a coun-
try; rather it means the country should be willing to
bind the reforms that serve its long-term interests.
In the Doha Round, a country should receive credit
for IMF reforms or unilateral improvements in its fi-
nancial services regime.
Box 1   Key objectives of the US
            insurance industry
· First, all countries should commit to protect the
acquired rights of investors already established
in their markets.
· Second, countries should commit, at a
minimum, to a standstill in their current
insurance practices. If a country currently
permits foreign investors to hold 51 percent in
an insurance operation, that 51 percent should
be guaranteed.  It makes no sense to bind less
than what is currently permitted.
· Third, countries should frame their insurance
commitments on the basis of a Model Schedule
that will protect acquired rights; permit freedom
of establishment, full market access, and
national treatment; and provide for insurance
regulation based on internationally accepted,
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Use forthcoming WTO accession agreements to
push for market opening and domestic reform
China is an excellent example of what can be
accomplished (although much remains to be done
to create a sound domestic financial system). The
experience with China can be applied to forthcom-
ing negotiations with Russia, for example.
Improve available data on and transparency
of barriers to cross-border transactions and
foreign entry
 Lack of comparable cross-country data is a gen-
eral problem in service sectors. Many services origi-
nate as nontradables; thus, existing information on
barriers to services and trade are scarce and diffi-
cult to compare across countries. Indices of open-
ness in the financial-services industries in key emerg-
ing-market economies are included in table 2. They
summarize commitments on the degree of financial
liberalization at the end of 1996. As table 1 indi-
cated, little forward movement occurred in 1997.
The indices in table 2 weighs various types of
barriers, including measures that limit the right of
establishment and ownership, limits on business ac-
tivities such as granting the ability to establish
branch offices or banks’ ATMs, restrictions on lend-
ing, or on permission to carry on universal banking
services and residency requirements for the officers
or staff of foreign financial institutions. The index
values also compare commitments (made in the 1997
FSA) with existing practice.
Commitments fall short of practice in some
economies (such as banking in Hong Kong), and ex-
ceed practice in others (securities in Indonesia). By
sector, entry into banking was more liberal than into
securities or insurance. By economy, many econo-
mies carried on discriminatory practices, with the
international financial centers in Hong Kong and
Singapore being the most open. Hong Kong was the
most open to all financial services, while South Ko-
rea was virtually closed to banking services, India
was similarly closed to insurance services; and Thai-
land was the least open to securities firms. Inter-
pretation of these indices requires fairly detailed
country knowledge; for example, Malaysia appears
to restrict foreign entry, but one of the reasons is
that it has restricted new licenses for insurance or
securities firms to both domestic and foreign firms.
Cross-border trade is less restricted than entry by
foreign firms to the domestic markets. Before the
1997-98 crisis, several countries allowed free access
to offshore banking services; in the wake of the cri-
sis some of these were substantially modified (to
correct distortions associated with the Bangkok In-
ternational Banking Facility, for example).t
Improvements in transparency would also reduce
the difficulties of considering a negative list to re-
place the positive list approach to negotiations. In
order to put more pressure on countries for broader
commitments, it is necessary to evaluate and com-
pare barriers to entry and cross-border flows in a
wider variety of services sectors. This suggests that
more could be made of the negative list approach as
an alternative framework? provided there is better
understanding of the starting point.
Broaden the coverage of bound commitments
Few countries have made sweeping commitments
to market access and national treatment in finan-
cial services. In his presentation, Bernard Hoekman
(Hoekman and Mattoo 2002) illustrated that Latin
American and Asian economies have been among
the most reluctant to open their insurance and core
banking sectors (figures 2 and 3), with the Africans
ahead in their commitments. Thus, another issue
for Doha is to encourage countries to commit that
Table 2  An index of openness in financial services, 1997
 Banking                             Securities                         Insurance
                         Commitment  Practice      Commitment  Practice     Commitment   Practice
Hong Kong            4.20       4.75      4.00 4.40        4.40            4.00
Indonesia           3.15              3.20                   3.50           3.00                  3.10            2.60
South Korea         1.10       1.70      1.70 2.10                  1.20            2.60
Malaysia           2.40              2.40        2.50       2.50        2.10            2.10
The Philippines     2.80              3.35                2.40      2.40        2.90            2.80
Singapore             2.25              2.50  2.70 2.70  4.10            4.10
Thailand     2.95              2.85                   2.00           2.00                  2.80            2.80
India     2.70              2.25                  2.50 2.10                  1.00            1.00
Average                2.69              2.88   2.66         2.65         2.70    2.75
Note: 1 = most closed
          5 = most open
Source: Claessens  and Glaessner (1998).ens  and Glaessner (1998).August 2002 PB02-8 9
F Figure 2    Liberalization indices based on GATS commitments:
                                          Core banking services
Source: Hoekman and Mattoo (2002).
Figure 3  Liberalization indices based on GATS commitments:
               Direct insurance services
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all services sectors will be subject to national treat-
ment and market access disciplines, with target dates
and transition periods. Surprising as it may seem,
aiming to bind the status quo for only a specified
share of all commitments is moderately ambitious.
Complementing this with efforts on rules to increase
the impact of multilateral disciplines for certain
modes of supply, particularly national treatment for
FDI, would also be timely.
As table 2 implies, OECD countries should con-
tinue to focus on market opening in developing coun-
tries and emerging-market economies to deepen and
broaden the limited commitments made in 1997,
particularly to provide a wider choice of commercial
presence for suppliers of financial services (such as
majority joint ventures, wholly-owned subsidiaries,
and branches) and to improve the scope of national
treatment commitments. Also, in view of the explo-
sion of Internet services since 1997, further com-
mitments should be made to the cross-border provi-
sion of financial services by electronic means.
Broaden the goals to encourage countries to per-
mit cross-border data flows
Stanley Fischer of Citigroup noted the importance
for large financial institutions in the OECD coun-
tries to be allowed to process and analyze data in
large centers that serve institutions in several coun-
tries. Countries that restrict the cross-border move-
ment of financial data can undermine the ability of
such institutions to evaluate and manage risk.  More
attention should be accorded to this issue, since it
foreshadows similar cross-border data transfer re-
quirements that will arise as electronic commerce in
financial services takes hold in emerging-market
economies. Of course, solutions will also have to ad-
dress privacy concerns.
Build a greater sense of ownership among
users of financial services in emerging-market
economies
A fundamental issue remains: How to persuade
reluctant developing countries that opening their fi-
nancial markets to foreign service providers serves
their long-term interest. OECD countries should re-
alize that proreform governments in developing
countries face domestic opposition from vested in-
terests that perceive a threat from increased com-
petition. Improved access to markets abroad will
assist in building constituencies for reform. The
Doha Round provides potential for a broader set of
trade-offs? advantages to developing coun-
tries? than was possible with the FSA talks in 1997.
Agriculture, apparel, and antidumping are poten-
tial candidates in goods, while movement of indi-
vidual workers is an issue in services. Even so, these
are difficult issues left over from previous rounds
and realism about the potential for such trade-offs
will be important.
Another way to build constituencies for reform
is to build technical capacity to negotiate these is-
sues in developing countries through supporting
training and technical assistance. As some Insti-
tute conference participants pointed out, with bet-
ter evidence of the social and private benefits of lib-
eralization now available, public and private sector
players should enlist available forums to dissemi-
nate this information.
Conclusion
These recommendations reflect a range of in-
terests represented at the conference. They also
reflect two fundamental points about forthcoming
multilateral negotiations. First, the OECD countries,
particularly the United States as the leader in fi-
nancial services, should approach the Doha Round
with the broad goal of ensuring that negotiations
encourage financial-market development. Second,
financial-sector evolution means that new players
will be seeking market access, adding asset and
wealth management, and financial advice and ad-
visory services,  to the traditional players.
The outline of the United States’ services offer,
published in summary form in early July 2002
(USTR 2002), reflects these conference perspectives
and sets out a useful conceptual framework for
Doha. The framework for financial services links
financial services liberalization with increased effi-
ciency and financial-sector stability. Importantly,
financial-market progress in developing countries
is also identified as “one of the most important cata-
lysts of economic and trade growth.”
Dobson, Wendy and Pierre Jacquet. 1998. Finan-
cial Services Liberalization in the WTO.
WashingWorld Bank. Photocopy..
OECD countries should
continue to focus on
market opening in
developing countries and
emerging-market economies.August 2002 PB02-8 11
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